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Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: 
Examining the Major Obstacles to 
Achieving Peace in Syria’s Civil War 
Amanda Pitrof* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As United States Senator George Mitchell noted in a discussion of peace 
negotiations in Northern Ireland, “Each human being is unique, as is each 
society.  It follows logically, then, that no two conflicts are the same.  Much 
as we would like it, there is no magic formula that, once discovered, can be 
used to end all conflicts.”1 
Peace negotiations on an international scale often present a number of 
particularly difficult hurdles because the conflicts involved typically include 
ethnic, racial, or religious differences.2  At the same time, these are high-
stakes conflicts because failure to find a solution risks not only the loss of 
life, but third party military intervention, as well as political, economic, and 
social disruption.3  On a personal level, these conflicts tear apart towns, 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2015, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1. George J. Mitchell, Toward Peace in Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1136, 
1139 (1999). 
 2. Leo F. Smyth, International Mediation and Capitulation to the Routine, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 235, 235 (2003). 
 3. Max Fisher, Everything is a Negotiation: How to Understand the Obama-Putin-Assad 
Standoff, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/09/13/everything-is-a-negotiation-how-
to-understand-the-obama-putin-assad-standoff/. 
1
Pitrof: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to A
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 157, 2015] Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
158 
villages, and families.  Even those lucky enough to survive often find 
themselves displaced, stuck living in overpopulated refugee camps far from 
home. 
And there is no playbook; no clear roadmap from violence to peace.  
Every conflict is colored by the ethnic, religious, political, and military 
interests of not just that particular country, but of the region and the rest of 
the world.4 
The struggle for peace has been waged over and over, from Yugoslavia,5 
to Iraq,6 to Northern Ireland,7 and elsewhere.8  Syria is no exception.  It is a 
country with a history of violent conflict and political instability.9  The 
current regime is authoritarian to the extreme, and the range of competing 
religious interests is diverse.10  The civil war now consuming the country has 
claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced millions, and thrown the 
country’s future into question.11  This article will first briefly examine the 
country’s turbulent history and the development of the current conflict.12  
 
 4. Steve Gutterman, Russia Says Iran Must be Invited to Syria Conference, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/us-syria-crisis-russia-
idUSBRE9A40BP20131105. 
 5. Keith Webb et al., The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency 
Model: A Critical Perspective, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 171, 171-91 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996). 
 6. Andrew K. Lavin, Achieving Peace in Iraq Through Negotiations: Lessons Learned from 
the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 571, 573 (2009). 
 7. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1138-40. 
 8. Darrel Menthe, Legalization and the Mediation of International Disputes: The Balkan 
Experience, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83, 83-84 (2007). 
 9. CIA, Syria, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sy.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Erika Solomon, Syria’s Death Toll Now Exceeds 140,000: Activist Group, REUTERS (Feb. 
15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-syria-crisis-toll-
idUSBREA1E0HS20140215. 
 12. See infra, Part II. 
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Next, it will evaluate previous attempts to solve the conflict.13  Then, it will 
analyze the challenges in brokering peace.14  Ultimately, this article will try 
to offer potential avenues for resolution.15 
 
Logically speaking, the use of mediation and negotiation as a means of 
avoiding or ending armed conflict is always preferred.  Ending an armed 
conflict avoids further loss of life as well as the progressive devastation to a 
country’s (or countries’) infrastructure and economy.  Building an 
understanding not just of the conflict itself, but also of the inherent obstacles 
to finding a solution, therefore, offers clear value.  An analysis must 
highlight any common characteristics across such conflicts as well as the 
impact of transformative complications—in Syria, this would include the use 
of chemical weapons, which introduce a strong humanitarian interest to 
negotiations.  As such, Syria offers a new case analysis to the ongoing study 
of conflict prevention and resolution. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN SYRIA 
The history of Syria is a complex one, indelibly tied to the problems it 
currently faces in its peace negotiations.  This section will attempt to lay out 
the relevant highlights of that history as simply as possible, recognizing that 
to do a thorough job could fill a library. 
So often in unstable countries, strife arises between groups with ethnic, 
religious, or ideological differences who are forced to live within artificially, 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. Since the initial drafting of this article in February 2014, Syria has seen a rapid escalation 
of its once-internal political unrest.  Third parties are no longer merely a looming threat, and the 
dynamics of the conflict have radically shifted with the emergence of the Islamic State.  The bulk of 
this article will remain an examination of Syria’s conflict as it stood in early February 2014.  See 
infra, Addendum, however, for a brief reflection on the conflict since that time and the effects of 
those changes on the issues addressed in this article.  
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and even arbitrarily, drawn borders.  Many of these countries have 
boundaries drawn by colonial powers bartering between themselves for 
political and economic gain.  Once these nations vacated, the newly born 
countries found themselves in a power vacuum, populated by groups with 
nothing in common but this new citizenship.  Syria fits squarely within this 
category.  Its borders were drawn by the Allied powers as part of the San 
Remo Conference following the end of World War I.16  The country 
remained under the control of France and Great Britain until it was granted 
independence in 1946.17 
When the last French troops departed, “Syria” was a county whose 
borders were drawn around various Muslim, Christian, and even Jewish 
communities.18  Within the Muslim population alone, there are several active 
factions, including Sunnis (which includes approximately 75% of the 
population),19 Alawites (a small minority including current President Bashar 
al-Assad and the majority of the current regime),20 and Druze (an 
unorthodox branch of Shia Islam).21  Where those three major sects were 
originally separated into autonomous regions by the French,22 independence 
brought territorial unification.23 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first decades of Syrian independence were 
marked by violence and a series of military coups as various groups vied for 
 
 16. San Remo Conference, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/israel/san-
remo-resolution/p15248.  
 17. CIA, supra note 9. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Max Fisher, The ‘Alawite Lane,’ WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/15/the-alawite-lane/. 
 21. CIA, supra note 9. 
 22. Syria Profile: A Chronology of Key Events, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-14703995 (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Syria Profile]. 
 23. Syria, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
578856/Syria/29922/World-War-II-and-independence (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). 
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control.24  In the first decade following the departure of the last French 
troops, the country had twenty different cabinets and drafted four divergent 
constitutions.25  In 1949 alone, the military led three coups.26  It was not until 
Hafiz al-Assad took power in a bloodless coup in 1970 that the country 
found some stability.  As a member of the Alawi sect of Islam, Assad 
initially distanced the government from religion, amending the constitution 
to remove the requirement that the country’s president be a Muslim.27  The 
secular shift was short-lived.  Stability was maintained through brutality,28 
and after the Sunni Muslim community and the Muslim Brotherhood led a 
series of failed riots, Hafiz al-Assad once more began to stress the 
importance of Syria’s adherence to Islam.29  A series of so-called 
“emergency laws” allowed the regime to lift protection for individual 
freedoms at will.30  Seven additional emergency laws and amendments 
followed, suspending personal liberties and further strengthening the 
president’s position.31  These laws, which remained in effect until the 
uprising of 2011, authorized arbitrary arrests and detention and suspended 
the protection of due process.32  Under these rules, the regime’s security 
officers could issue arrest orders without the authority of a court and without 
oversight from the government.33  Mass arrests and security sweeps fell 
within the scope of these rules.34  Another measure passed in 1979 following 
 
 24. CIA, supra note 9. 
 25. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Farid N. Ghadry, Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath, MIDDLE E. Q., Winter 2005, at 61-
70, available at http://www.meforum.org/683/syrian-reform-what-lies-beneath. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
5
Pitrof: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Examining the Major Obstacles to A
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 157, 2015] Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
162 
attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood on a number of military cadets made 
membership in the organization a crime punishable by death.35 
When Sunni Muslim activists launched a massive protest in the city of 
Hama in 1982, Assad’s brutality reached its zenith.36  For days, troops hit the 
city with artillery fire, razing the city and killing an estimated 20,000 
people.37  The massacre is now considered the single biggest attack by an 
Arab ruler on his own people in the modern era.38  An entire city was 
demolished, but the rebellion was effectively neutralized—an outcome the 
Assad regime would seek again later. 
In June of 2000, Hafez al-Assad died, and was succeeded by his second 
son, Bashar.39  On his ascension, the new president promised to build “a 
better society” for his people, and soon after ordered the release of 600 
political prisoners.40  Optimism abounded for a more democratic Syria.  
Diplomatic relations were restored with Iraq and Lebanon for the first time 
in decades, and the European Union re-launched a dialogue with Damascus 
as relations with the West gradually improved.41  As was the case during 
Hafez’s reign, however, the policy did not last. 
Tensions with the West began to escalate in 2007 after the United 
Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
 
 35. Id.  A number of those killed were Alawites, the minority religious sect to which the Assad 
family and the bulk of its regime belong.  Id. 
 36. 1982: Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama, GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-syria-
massacre-1982-archive [hereinafter Hama Rebellion]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Ghadry, supra note 30.  It is worth noting that Bashar was never expected to assume 
power.  Bashar al-Assad, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/711020/Bashar-al-Assad (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).  
The second son, Bashar, was trained as an ophthalmologist in London.  Id.  It was only after his 
elder brother, Bassel, was killed in a car crash in 1994 that Bashar became Syria’s next-in-line.  Id.   
 40. Ghadry, supra note 30. 
 41. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
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(IAEA), uncovered traces of man-made uranium at two separate sites in 
Syria.42  The United States accused Assad’s regime of attempting to produce 
weapons of mass destruction and levied new sanctions against Damascus.43 
To hasten matters, corruption was—and is—widespread in Syria.  
Experts estimated that as much as 85% of Syrian oil profits were diverted to 
the Assad family and its collaborators.44  At $55 per barrel,45 the 600,000 
barrels per day produced by Syria’s oil fields generated $12 billion, and yet 
in 2003, Syria’s total budget was only $8.4 billion, including non-oil trade 
and taxation.46 
Spurred by spirited uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and protests in Libya, 
a Syrian revolt began in March of 2011.47  Activists called for a “Day of 
Rage,” demanding the repeal of the emergency laws, release of political 
prisoners, and removal of corrupt officials originally appointed by the Assad 
regime.48  Several protestors were arrested for displaying graffiti calling for 
the downfall of Assad’s regime.49  Despite widespread arrests by security 
forces, demonstrations continued.  Within months, the crackdown ratcheted 
upward as electricity, water, and cell service were cut off.50  Assad ordered 
thousands of troops, along with tanks and snipers, to quell the protests, firing 
on civilians as often as active combatants.51  Assad accused the protestors of 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
44.    Ghadry, supra note 30. 
 45. This is an extremely conservative estimate.  See Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels 
Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 7, 2014); 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/prices.cfm. 
 46. Ghadry, supra note 30. 
 47. CIA, supra note 9. 
 48. Associated Press, Syrian Uprising Timelines of Key Events, POLITICO, Sept. 9, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/syria-timeline-96270.html [hereinafter Uprising Timelines]; 
Syria Profile, supra note 22.   
 49. Uprising Timelines, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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being Israeli agents, but also announced several conciliatory measures in an 
effort to end the rebellion.52  Dozens of political prisoners were released, 
government officials were dismissed, and the emergency laws were 
repealed.53  But the protests continued unabated.54  In July, opposition forces 
met in Istanbul, Turkey to form a unified opposition.55 
 III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S REACTION AND EARLY 
ATTEMPTS FOR RESOLUTION 
The West was quick to decry the government’s crackdown on 
protestors.  As the strife continued, several members of the United Nations 
(U.N.) Security Council attempted to pass a resolution denouncing the Assad 
regime and calling for Assad himself to step down.56  Russia and China 
vetoed the effort, first in October 2011 and again in February 2012.57  In 
November 2011, one month after the first resolution failed, the Arab League 
voted to suspend Syria’s membership to the group, imposing sanctions and 
accusing Assad’s government of “failing to implement an Arab peace 
plan.”58 
There was renewed hope for resolution in late 2011 when Syria agreed 
to an Arab League initiative, allowing a monitoring mission into the 
 
 52. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 53. The repeal, of course, did nothing to curb the mass arrests conducted by the security 
forces.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  Since that time, however, the opposition movement has struggled for cohesion, and 
any attempt to bring all opposition members to the negotiation table consistently fail.  See infra for 
discussion of the opposition’s shortcomings as a cohesive group. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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country.59  Within two months, however, the mission was suspended, and 
both sides traded accusations of duplicity and bias.60 
By August of 2012, the U.N. General Assembly passed its own 
resolution over the protests of Russia, China, and several other members 
demanding that Assad resign.61  Frustrated by the lack of progress, Kofi 
Annan resigned as special peace envoy of both the U.N. and the Arab 
League.62  Mr. Annan blamed the intractability of the Syrian government, 
the militarization of the Syrian rebels,63 and the failure of the U.N. Security 
Council to rally behind his efforts.64 
The U.N. brokered another cease-fire in October of 2012, but the peace 
was brief, and the mission was soon suspended.65  Tensions would quickly 
accelerate in August of 2013 when allegations arose that the Assad regime 
utilized chemical weapons in a strike on the outskirts of Damascus.66  A 
U.N. investigation uncovered the deaths of over 300 civilians, and Western 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. The Arab League monitors accused the Assad regime of “escalating the security situation,” 
while Syria insisted that the monitor mission was only intended to pressure the U.N. Security 
Council into approving foreign intervention.  CNN Wire Staff, Amid Violence, Arab League 
Suspends Observer Mission in Syria, CNN (Jan. 28, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/28/world/meast/syria-unrest/. 
 61. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 62. Rick Gladstone, Resigning as Envoy to Syria, Annan Casts Wide Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syria-peace-
envoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 63. See infra Part III (discussing the arming of Syrian rebels by third parties). 
 64. Gladstone, supra note 62 (“[W]ithout serious, purposeful and united international pressure, 
including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian 
government in the first place, and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a political 
process. . . .  It is clear that President Bashar al-Assad must leave office[.]”). 
 65. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 66. A recent U.S. human rights report identified the attack “as one of ‘many horrors in a civil 
war filled with countless crimes against humanity, from the torture and murder of prisoners to the 
targeting of civilians with barrel bombs and Scud missiles.’”  Syrian Civil War “Horrors” Lead U.S. 
Human Rights Report, BBC (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-26377552 
[hereinafter Civil War Horrors].  
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powers, the United States in particular, threatened retaliatory missile 
strikes.67  The violation of humanitarian law sparked public outrage in 
addition to political fallout.  For several days, the conflict looked poised to 
expand from what was essentially a civil war68 (and a political conflict) to a 
regional, or even global, military conflict with the introduction of third party 
military forces.69  It was narrowly avoided with the introduction of U.N. 
Security Council resolution 2118, demanding the destruction or removal of 
Syria’s chemical stockpile by mid-2014.70 
As of February 2014, an estimated 140,000 people had been killed in the 
civil war, including 7,000 children.71  Another 3.5 million people were 
displaced within Syria’s borders, and 2.5 million others abandoned Syria for 
neighboring countries.72  The number of refugees was expected to double by 
the end of the year.73 
 
 67.  What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, BBC (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24628442 [hereinafter Geneva II Conference].  
 68. It cannot be overlooked that as it stood in early 2014, the Syrian civil war is not limited to 
Syrian combatants.  International volunteers and extremists seeking to participate in what they 
viewed as a “holy war” were present, but at the time of this writing, their numbers were incredibly 
limited in comparison to the number of troops that would likely be introduced by a third party.   
 69. Geneva II Conference, supra note 67. 
 70. S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf. 
 71. Solomon, supra note 11. 
 72. The report estimates that nearly 900,000 refugees reside in Lebanon, 600,000 in Turkey, 
590,000 in Jordan, 215,000 in northern Iraq, 135,000 in Egypt, 20,000 in North Africa, and 30,000 
elsewhere.  Syrians Internally Displaced by War Expected to Nearly Double to 6.5 Million by Year’s 
End, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47084#.VFF8qPnF98F [hereinafter Syrians 
Internally Displaced].   
 73. Id. 
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A. Attempts at International Action 
Lack of consensus within the international community has hampered 
efforts to ease the crisis.  An international coalition (later known as the 
Action Group for Syria), consisting of the U.N., Arab League, and EU 
(China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S., and Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and 
Qatar) met in June 2012 to discuss the conflict, ultimately writing what has 
become known as the Geneva Communiqué.74  The pact called for the 
creation of a transitional Syrian government and a clear plan for elections, 
noting that any political solution to the conflict would need to meet several 
conditions.75  However, even as the plan was announced, delegations from 
the U.S. and Russia publicly disagreed on Assad’s role in the transitional 
government.76 
A similar plan was outlined a year later at the G8 meeting in Northern 
Ireland.  In the wake of the Assad regime’s chemical weapon attacks in the 
summer of 2013, the group outlined a seven-step plan for peace, 
condemning the use of chemical weaponry, supporting the creation of a non-
sectarian government,77 and calling once more for a transitional 
 
 74. The gathering later became known as the Geneva I conference.  Action Group for Syria, 
Final Communiqué, U.N. (June 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf [hereinafter 
Geneva Communiqué]. 
 75. Id. at 3-4.  The communiqué declared that “[a]ny political settlement must deliver a 
transition that: [o]ffers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria; [e]stablishes 
clear steps according to a firm time-table towards the realization of that perspective; [c]an be 
implemented in a climate of safety for all, stability and calm; [and i]s reached rapidly without further 
bloodshed and violence and is credible.”  Id. at 2.2. 
 76. UN Envoy Calls for Transitional Government in Syria, BBC (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18650775. 
 77. G8 Leaders Agree to 7-point Plan on Syria as Summit Wraps, CBC NEWS (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/g8-leaders-agree-to-7-point-plan-on-syria-as-summit-wraps-
1.1329796 [hereinafter G8 Plan]. 
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government.78  Perhaps most importantly, the group vowed to “maximize the 
diplomatic pressure” to bring all involved parties to the table.79 
A second conference—the Geneva II Conference—was organized to 
engage the Assad regime with the National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.80  While considered mildly successful 
in bringing both sides together, that achievement was mitigated by several 
factors.  Though present, the Syrian government announced that its official 
delegation had no plans “to hand over power to anyone,”81 characterizing the 
ongoing conflict as a “war against terrorism.”82  As for the opposition 
coalition, only “intense pressure” from its allies persuaded most of the 
group’s leaders to make an appearance.83  One-third of the active members 
flatly refused to attend a vote on whether to participate, and the Syrian 
National Council—the largest block within the coalition—reportedly 
announced plans to abandon the coalition, refusing to attend any peace 
negotiations until Assad agreed to leave power.84  As of the drafting of this 
article, no agreement had been reached at the Geneva II Convention. 
As it stands, the Syrian civil war has cost hundreds of thousands of lives 
on both sides, caused widespread conflict, and resulted in the destruction of 
many of the country’s major cities.  When this struggle is finally resolved, 
rebuilding will take billions of dollars in aid.  As it is, Syria’s neighbors are 
already feeling the strain as tens of thousands of refugees stream across their 
borders.  Both sides of the conflict are entrenched, refusing to even approach 
the negotiation table without a sign of capitulation from the other.  To make 
matters worse, both sides have been equipped with weaponry from third 
 
 78. Once again, a transitional government was demanded without a consensus regarding 
Bashar al-Assad’s role in that transition.  Id. 
 79. G8 Plan, supra note 77. 
 80. Geneva II Conference, supra note 67. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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party nations guarding their interests.  The hurdles facing resolution abound, 
but the next section of this article will attempt to identify the major obstacles 
and offer possible remedies. 
 IV. THE BIGGEST HURDLES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Problem #1: Are negotiations even likely to bring peace?  At this point, 
the possibility of brokering peace through one-to-one negotiations between 
the Assad regime and opposition forces appears to be a long shot.  Both 
sides have dug in, refusing to even appear at the negotiation table without 
concessions the other is unwilling (nor are they realistically likely) to grant.  
As large portions of Syria’s opposition coalition refuse to even appear for 
negotiations until Assad relinquishes power, the government continues to 
regard the opposition movement as a product of internal and external 
terrorism.85  Left to their own devices, there is little hope for reconciliation.  
It seems more likely the two will escalate violence in an effort to gain an 
advantage.86 
Proposed Solution: The use of mediation, with the involvement of a 
neutral third party to direct discussions and act as an unbiased go-between, is 
the better option.  Geneva II demonstrated the success of forcing the two 
sides to the table through diplomatic pressure, suggesting that bringing in a 
third party would at least have some usefulness in raising hopes for a 
temporary cease-fire and engagement in discussions from both sides.  Of 
course, mediation brings its own set of problems.87  To start with, there does 
not seem to be a consensus as to who should be at the table to represent each 
side. 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. This was already seen when the Assad regime resorted to the use of chemical warfare on 
innocent civilians. 
 87. See infra Problem #5 (discussing the difficulties in choosing such an arbitrator, as well as 
combatting international interests and dealing with international scrutiny). 
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Problem #2: Who should be at the table?  The first step in attempting 
peace negotiations must be determining who should represent the opposing 
factions.  The nature of Syria’s opposition movement makes this particularly 
difficult.  As discussed earlier, this conflict encompasses a full range of 
diverse groups, from secular to extremist.88  Numerous groups consider 
themselves a part of the opposition movement, but finding a means of 
unifying has been difficult.  The Syrian National Coalition,89 an umbrella 
group formed in Istanbul, considers itself the leadership of the opposition 
and is recognized by the Arab League and several countries (including the 
United States)90 as the true “representative” of the Syrian people.91  Yet 
some Syrians disagree, arguing that the Group cannot be truly representative 
of what began as a popular uprising since it is dominated by exiles and 
Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers.92  Some even accuse the group of being 
manipulated by the Arab League.93  Dozens of other groups (both diplomatic 
and armed opposition groups) consider themselves a part of the opposition 
movement, ranging from the more moderate94 to the extremists motivated by 
sectarian interests.95  Each has a diverging opinion not only on the future of 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but on what should follow.96  None of these fringe 
organizations currently have a seat at the negotiations table, and without 
representation for their interests, they continue to fight with total disregard 
 
 88. See supra Part II. 
 89. Initially called the Syrian National Council, the Coalition was a new iteration created in 
2012.  Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 90. Britain, France, Turkey, and the Gulf states also recognize Syria’s opposition National 
Coalition as “the legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.  Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 91. Id.; see S.B., Who Are the Syrian Opposition?, THE ECONOMIST (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-12. 
 92. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 93. Id. 
 94. This includes Liwa al-Taheed, which is at least believed to be part of the Supreme Military 
Command, headed by a defected brigadier-general with the Coalition.  Id. 
 95. This includes Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda.  Id. 
 96. Id. 
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for the proceedings in Geneva.97  Such “behind the table” conflicts serve as a 
major barrier to progress at peace negotiations.98  Moreover, a peace 
agreement satisfying the Assad regime and only select groups within the 
opposition is unlikely to end these “behind the table” disagreements within 
the opposition community and, therefore, offers little hope for resolution.99 
Proposed Solution: These are issues to be worked out within the 
opposition movement.  Any hopeful mediation must begin with a unified 
opposition devoted to negotiating a settlement.  Unrepresented groups will 
otherwise have no incentive to lay down arms.  Even if the Syrian National 
Coalition was considered an adequate representative for the movement, the 
organization has made any peace negotiation conditional on the resignation 
of President Bashar al-Assad.  Unsurprisingly, it is a point on which the 
Assad regime refuses to agree. 
Problem #3: The fractured nature of the opposition movement.  To 
determine who should represent the opposition, the movement must first find 
a rallying point.  As discussed earlier, the movement currently offers almost 
an entire political and ideological spectrum under the single umbrella of 
“opposition.”  When the opposition coalition is intact, it incorporates at least 
seven major movements: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus 
Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee, the 
Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Bloc, and Independents.100  One of the problems 
is that the nature of the revolt has drastically shifted since it began back in 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Robert H. Mnookin et al., Barriers to Progress at the Negotiation Table: Internal Conflicts 
Among Israelis and Among Palestinians, 6 NEV. L.J. 299, 300-01 (2005) (noting that broader 
demands to satisfy the more extreme members of a side essentially dooms negotiations across the 
table, while more palatable offers “risk[] turmoil and even violence ‘behind the table’ within each 
community”). 
 99. Id. at 301. 
 100. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 4: 
SYRIA’S POLITICAL OPPOSITION 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Political_Opposition.pdf. 
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March 2011.101  Early protestors fought for political freedoms and the repeal 
of repressive laws.102  As the conflict dragged on, more radical factions 
jumped in.103  While many of these groups shared the early protestors’ goal 
of overturning the government, their ultimate objectives proved 
polarizing.104  Some left the country and joined up with exiles, creating new 
political groups.105  A number of smaller groups joined to become the Free 
Syrian Army,106 attacking government checkpoints and facilities in 
retaliation for government strikes.107  The dozens of groups involved are 
fragmented geographically, ideologically, and even by the influence of 
foreign backers.108 
Proposed Solution: The ultimate goal must be defined before the 
opposition can select who will represent this goal at the negotiation table.  
The various factions could first agree to cease hostilities, then move to the 
more complex questions of a transitional government (and Assad’s role in 
it).  Ultimately, any kind of solution will require an effort to include as many 
Syrian interests as possible.109  Without such considerations, opposition 
 
 101. See Liz Sly, Islamic Law Comes to Rebel-held Areas of Syria, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-law-comes-to-rebel-held-
syria/2013/03/19/b310532e-90af-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html. 
 102. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 103. Id. 
 104. O’BAGY, supra note 100. 
 105. S.B., supra note 91. 
 106. This is merely a label, not a real organization.  See id.  There is no strict hierarchy or 
leadership; the title is a label to loosely group smaller factions together.  See id.  It does, however, 
“attract funding from expatriates, Gulf governments and private individuals who wanted to see Mr. 
Assad go.”  Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  See infra Problem #4 (discussing this influence of third parties on the peace 
negotiation process). 
 109. Vanessa J. Jimenez, Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road Ahead, 13 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21, 22-23 (2005) (noting that the “ability of Iraqi leaders to forge a peaceful future 
will depend on the manner in which the government ensures that the unique identities, values, and 
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leadership risks the loss of popular support, creating a new government with 
the same flaws of its predecessor.  The challenge is parsing those interests 
out from the influence of third parties. 
Problem #4: Influence of international interests.  This seems to be the 
biggest hurdle to any attempt at brokering peace, whether through mediation 
or negotiation.  In protracted conflicts, problems become more widespread.  
Everyone eventually has a stake.  Turkey and Israel have been drawn into 
direct conflict with Syrian troops on several occasions,110 while Lebanon, 
Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other countries in North Africa have seen the arrival 
of tens of thousands of refugees seeking to escape the conflict.111  In 2014, 
the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) requested $6.5 billion in aid to support 
both refugees and internally displaced persons.112 
While it is understandable that almost everyone may have an interest in 
the outcome of a conflict, these interests create problems when trying to 
establish common ground.  Where the original protestors in Syria might 
have sought a more democratic political system, extremist fighters seek to 
install an Islamic state.  Beyond those actively fighting, the Arab League 
wishes to end the ongoing threat of regional instability; and on an even 
broader scope, Russian leaders in the Kremlin wish to preserve the Assad 
regime in order to retain hold on their last remaining naval base outside of 
the former Soviet bloc, while U.S. officials would welcome the opportunity 
to weaken Russia’s influence in the region.  All manifest themselves in 
different ways: activists in Syria continue to fight, the Arab League offers 
monitoring missions, and the Russian and U.S. governments overtly or 
covertly continue arms sales to their respective interests.113 
 
concerns of its diverse ethnic, religious, and national minorities are respected and given a voice in 
the governance of the country”). 
 110. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 111. Syrians Internally Displaced, supra note 72. 
 112. Id. 
 113. This is not to suggest that Russia is alone in supplying arms to the Syrian conflict, merely 
that the Kremlin is a prominent example.  Thomas Grove & Erika Solomon, Russia Boosts Arms 
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Arming rebels is not a new tactic, but it is a risky one.114  If it fails to 
turn the tide of a conflict in one’s favor, it can actually prolong it.  Even 
more risky, as recent history has shown, arming rebel groups runs the risk of 
arms falling into the hands of extremist groups, empowering the groups the 
West seeks most to avoid.115  Fueling one side with arms only escalates a 
conflict, pushing allies of an opponent to respond in kind.  Syria is a perfect 
model.  Russia has repeatedly made efforts to ship arms to the Assad 
government; while the United States refuses to directly arm Syrian rebels, 
there is clear evidence that it and several western allies, including France, 
have done exactly that for opposition groups.116  Such influence has 
produced no clear results other than a rise in the death tolls and the arming 
of extremist groups.117 
The influx of competing international interests is likewise an issue with 
a tendency to prolong conflict, bogging down negotiations as each party vies 
for its best outcome.  While countries in the West seek resolutions on 
sanctions and military strikes through the U.N. in the hope of achieving 
humanitarian aims,118 Russia and China consistently use their veto power to 
 
Sales to Syria Despite World Pressure, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/21/us-syria-russia-arms-idUSTRE81K13420120221; see 
also Liz Sly & Karen DeYoung, In Syria, New Influx of Weapons to Rebels Tilts the Battle Against 
Assad, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-syria-new-influx-of-
weapons-to-rebels-tilts-the-battle-against-assad/2013/02/23/a6bf2bc0-7dfb-11e2-9073-
e9dda4ac6a66_story.html. 
 114. Mark Hosenball, Congress Secretly Approves U.S. Weapons Flow to ‘Moderate’ Syrian 
Rebels, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-usa-
syria-rebels-idUSBREA0Q1S320140127; see also James Risen et al., U.S.-approved Arms for Libya 
Rebels Fell Into Jihadis’ Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/africa/weapons-sent-to-libyan-rebels-with-us-approval-
fell-into-islamist-hands.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 115. Risen et al., supra note 114. 
 116. Grove & Solomon, supra note 113; Hosenball, supra note 114. 
 117. Sly, supra note 101. 
 118. See Civil War Horrors, supra note 66.  There are of course other interests involved here, 
such as regional stability and oil.  United States President Barack Obama was not shy about his 
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prevent U.N. intervention.119  The nexus of the conflict for these parties 
becomes the U.N., drawing focus and energy from the actual conflict. 
The manner in which these mediations are conducted seems to 
exacerbate the problem—to borrow a well-known idiom, “too many cooks in 
the kitchen spoils the broth.”  As discussed earlier, the use of mediation over 
negotiation seems the more promising choice.120  That being said, allowing 
twenty-six countries, in addition to the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, the 
High Representative of the European Union, and the Secretary General of 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to take part in the Geneva II 
Convention121 draws attention away from problem solving.122  For example, 
a dispute over Iran’s potential participation became the focal point of the 
conference for a solid week and a half, as the international community 
debated the merits of inviting the controversial state.123  In that span of time, 
an untold number of people were killed, others wounded, and even more 
displaced.124  Adding twenty-six more parties to the table means adding 
twenty-six more viewpoints to the discussions, each with individual interests 
and objectives. 
 
intent to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons against civilians.  Jeff Mason and 
Matt Spetalnick, Obama Makes Case for Punishing Syria Over Gas Attack, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-syria-crisis-
idUSBRE97K0EL20130828.   
 119. Syria Profile, supra note 22. 
 120. See supra Part II. 
 121. This list does not even include the participants representing the Syrian government and the 
country’s opposition movement. 
 122. See Bama Atassi, Explaining the Geneva II Peace Talks on Syria, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 19, 
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/explaining-geneva-ii-peace-talks-syria-
2014118142853937726.html. 
 123. Iran Invited to Geneva 2, Syrian Opposition Threatens to Withdraw, RIA-NOVOSTI (Jan. 
19, 2014), http://rt.com/news/iran-invited-geneva-conference-867/. 
 124. Syrians Internally Displaced, supra note 72. 
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Proposed Solution: The simpler the conflict, the simpler the resolution.  
Removing as many conflicting interests as possible is a pathway to success.  
Syria’s civil war is indelibly tied to differing political, religious, and cultural 
interests, and when the dust ultimately settles, it is the Syrian people who 
must be confident in the method through which they reconcile these 
differences.  It is they who must pick up the pieces and try to move forward, 
and so it seems logical that the diverse interests of the Syrian people must 
take precedence in any mediation efforts.  The international community has 
taken advantage of several opportunities they have had to lay out their own 
interests in the creation of proposals, like the Geneva Communiqué or the 
G8’s seven-step plan for peace.  There is no question that any resolution 
must be in accordance with accepted international law.  While these 
proposals and declarations should unquestionably be submitted to the 
conflicting sides for consideration in working toward a resolution, 
attempting to reconcile the interests of twenty-six different countries adds 
unnecessary complications to the process.  This conflict is dense enough 
without the added burdens of so many other parties.125 
Problem #5: Public scrutiny elevating the stakes.  In the same vein, the 
nature of such publicized conferences, like Geneva I and Geneva II, 
encourage public scrutiny, raising expectations on an international scale.  In 
such a protracted conflict, where the lines in the sand have been so clearly 
drawn, negotiations reach a point where anything less than a complete 
victory has the appearance of a loss.  Participating countries enter with set 
goals and with the understanding that developments within the summit will 
largely become public knowledge.  As evidenced by the disputed 
participation of Iran at the Geneva II Convention, this individual interest 
suggests that the priority at such summits is not achieving a common goal of 
peace but in pursuing individual interests and saving face on an international 
 
 125. Ideally, of course, this removal of conflicting interests would involve a cessation of arms 
shipments to either side, in the interest of ending the violent conflict as soon as possible.  
Realistically, this is unlikely to occur, especially given the difficulty in exposing exactly who is 
supplying what to whom. 
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stage.  Given the fractured nature of the Syrian opposition, risking the 
appearance of anything less than a complete victory is a risky proposition.  
A partial victory, as discussed above, runs a chance of alienating minority 
groups and prolonging conflict. 
 Proposed Solution: There has been some suggestion that peace in 
deeply entrenched conflicts is more often found through “quiet diplomacy” 
than on the international stage.126  Negotiations handled without such 
concern for public image allow for more practical, and likely more 
productive, dialogue because special representatives and personal envoys 
acting in this capacity “tend not to reveal what they do and how they do 
it.”127  This is a process that saw great success in solving conflicts in 
Northern Ireland, Haiti, Guatemala, the Balkans, and elsewhere.128  When 
parties are not required to answer for every step of negotiation, posturing 
seems to take a backseat to practical problem solving.  Moreover, not only 
would such a method reduce public scrutiny, but it would likewise diminish 
the number of voices present at the mediation table. 
Problem #5: Who may act as mediator?  Even after mediation efforts 
are pared down to involve the most affected parties, conflicting international 
interests complicate the process of selecting an unbiased third party to serve 
as mediator.129  For there to be any hope of success, a mediator must have 
the trust of both parties, along with an ability to operate without bias.130  
 
 126. Michael R. Fowler, The Increasingly Complicated World of International Mediation, 18 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 977, 978 (2003). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Lavin, supra note 6, at 574-75. 
 129. This assumes, of course, that a third party mediator is appropriate.  Russia and Iran have 
both pushed the idea that the ongoing conflict is entirely Syrian, and therefore, the Syrian people 
should be left to negotiate their own peace.  Ilya Arkhipov et al., Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against 
Military Aid to Syria Protests After Libya, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01/russia-warns-u-s-nato-against-military-aid-to-syria-
protests-after-libya.html. 
 130. The Right Mediator: How Do You Know?, INT’L MEDIATION INST., 
http://imimediation.org/the-right-mediator-how-do-you-know (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
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Given the number of conflicting interests in this conflict, finding such a 
person or group is no easy feat.  Religion, political ideology, humanitarian 
causes, and questions of regional stability are all tied to this conflict. 
Proposed Solution: The most viable choice is Lakhdar Brahimi, current 
representative of both the U.N. and the Arab League.131 
In negotiating peace for Northern Ireland, it was U.S. Senator George 
Mitchell’s patience and his belief that there is “no such thing as a conflict 
that can’t be ended . . . [that] [n]o matter how ancient the conflict, no matter 
how hateful, no matter how hurtful, peace can prevail,”132 that ultimately 
brought an end to the country’s strife.  By the time he served as a mediator 
in Ireland, Mitchell had developed a familiarity and, more importantly, a 
respect for the culture with which he was involved.133  His work as the 
Majority Leader in the United States Senate moreover lent him experience in 
the process of understanding “trade-offs, communication, and effective 
listening.”134 
Like Mitchell, Brahimi is an experienced mediator.  An Algerian 
diplomat, Brahimi was involved in the resolution of conflicts ranging from 
Lebanon’s 15-year civil war to the establishment of Iraq’s first free elections 
in 2004.135  Now serving in place of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan as envoy to Syria, Brahimi is renowned for his patience and 
creativity.136  Of equal importance, Brahimi has a familiarity with Islamic 
culture.  Himself a member of the Sunni branch of Islam, Brahimi will find 
 
 131. Ian Black, Geneva II Talks on Syria: Key Participants, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/24/geneva-ii-talks-syria-key-participants. 
 132. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, TRUMAN INST. PEACE PRIZE ADDRESS: PRINCIPLES OF PEACE: 
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST 4 (June 8, 1999). 
 133. John D. Feerick, The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
229, 236-37 (2003) (discussing the importance of symbols, such as what locations would be the 
venues for the talks that would take place and his decisions on how many people should be at each 
discussion). 
 134. Mitchell, supra note 132, at ix, 5. 
 135. Black, supra note 131. 
 136. Id. 
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comfort with the “honor, dignity, and self-respect” valued in Muslim 
culture.137  His familiarity with and respect for the norms of Muslim culture 
would be a significant advantage in bringing both sides together. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It would be naïve to assert that these five roadblocks are the only 
impediments to reaching peace in Syria.  New issues seem to arise every 
day, ranging from economic and political to social questions.  It is not the 
contention of this article that solving these few issues would lead to 
resolution or even accelerate progress toward a resolution.  It is the 
contention of this article, however, that these five concerns must be 
addressed before there can be any hope for progress.  The Syrian people 
must be allowed to determine their future, and international participation in 
that process must be limited to a point that it facilitates that determination, 
rather than bogging it down. 
Solutions to armed conflict are never easy.  And as the protracted 
negotiations in Syria have shown, nor are they quick.  Only by focusing on 
Syrian interests, with an eye to minority protection as well as to majority, 
can peace eventually be found in Syria.  Both sides must first agree on a 
shared goal of peace and find a framework for agreement in the hope of 
ultimately reaching that goal. 
 ADDENDUM: A BRIEF REVIEW OF WHAT HAS CHANGED FROM 
FEBRUARY TO SEPTEMBER 
Nearly 2,000 people died in Syria in the first nine days of the Geneva II 
Conference,138 and once more, participants in Geneva failed to produce any 
 
 137. See Joshua Berry, The Trouble We Have with the Iraqis is Us: A Proposal for Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the New Iraq, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 487, 511 (2005). 
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tangible results.  Fighting continued in Syria throughout the spring of 2014, 
as both sides struggled to gain any momentum.  Amid the continuing 
conflict, President Assad was somewhat inexplicably reelected in June for a 
third term by a landslide majority in government-controlled areas of the 
country. 139  Although the “election” marked the first time in decades that 
other candidates were permitted to run against a member of the Assad 
family, the exercise was viewed as little more than a farce by the West.140 
In August, U.N. officials declared the Syrian crisis “the biggest 
humanitarian emergency of our era,” noting that “[a]lmost half of all Syrians 
have now been forced to abandon their homes and flee for their lives.”141  
Over three million Syrians have fled across the country’s borders, and 
experts estimate another six and a half million people have been displaced 
within Syria’s borders.142  At the end of August, the Human Rights Data 
Analysis Group placed the death toll since March 2011 at 191,369.143 
 
 138. Reuters, At Least 1,870 Die During Geneva Talks, DAILY STAR, Jan. 31, 2014, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/articleprint.aspx?id=246045&mode=print. 
 139. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Wins Third Term, BBC (June 5, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27706471.  Regions in the north and east, held by 
rebels, were excluded entirely from voting.  Id.  Officials claimed that 11.63 million Syrians 
participated out of a total 15.85 million Syrians eligible to vote.  Id.  President Assad was credited 
with receiving 88.7% of the total votes, while his challengers, Hassan al-Nouri and Maher Hajjar, 
received 4.3% and 3.2%, respectively.  Id. 
 140. Id.  United States Secretary of State John Kerry noted, “You can’t have an election where 
millions of your people don’t even have an ability to vote.”  Id. 
 141. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Syrian Refugees Surpass 3 Million, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/middleeast/syrian-refugees-surpass-3-million-
un-says.html?_r=0. 
 142. Id.  Syria’s neighbors have been struggling under the weight of the onslaught.  Id.  
Lebanon, which itself has a population under 5 million people, has taken in more than 1.1 million 
Syrian refugees, while Jordan has an estimated 608,000 and Turkey another 815,000, according to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  Id.  
 143. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Death Toll in Syria Estimated at 191,000, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-estimate-of-dead-in-syrian-
conflict-to-191000.html. 
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By far, however, the most significant shift in the ongoing conflict has 
been the emergence of the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).  
A splinter cell of al-Qaeda, it is the IS’s goal to create an Islamic state 
(governed by sharia law) that spans the Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria.144  
Since bursting onto the international scene in 2014, the group has been 
responsible for kidnapping schoolchildren for radical indoctrination; seizing 
airports, television stations, oil fields,145 and cities; and brutally beheading 
western citizens.146  By July of 2014, the IS was in control of all Syrian cities 
between Deir Ezzor and the Iraqi border—nearly 90 miles—as well as a 
significant portion of the Sunni region of Iraq.147  In response, world leaders 
have pledged their respective militaries to combat the IS’s growing 
influence.148  To further complicate matters, the IS draws its radical recruits 
from every corner of the globe.149  In short, since February, this once-
internal struggle rapidly escalated into what is now unquestionably a global 
conflict. 
Events since spring have made any attempt at mediation a distant hope.  
The IS has demonstrated its disinterest in any form of negotiation.  There 
can be no hope of peace in Syria—or the region as a whole—until the threat 
 
 144. CNN Library, ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts. 
 145. On July 3, 2014, the IS took control of the al-Omar oil field, Syria’s largest oil field, 
capable of producing 75,000 barrels of oil per day.  Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Holly Yan & Samira Said, Floodgates Open as ISIS Bridges Victories Between Syria and 
Iraq, CNN (July 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war/. 
 148. Editorial Board, The Attack on ISIS Expands to Syria, N.Y, TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/opinion/president-obamas-speech-on-isis-has-to-address-
costs.html. 
 149. There are recruits from Europe and the U.S., but experts point to Turkey as one of the 
largest sources of new recruits—over 1,000 new IS members have come from Turkey alone.  Ceylan 
Yeginsu, ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits from Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html. 
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of the IS is addressed.  Simplification, therefore, remains the watchword.  To 
that end, the best that can be said for the radical group’s rise to prominence 
is that it provides common ground (however slight) for pro-Assad and rebel 
forces, as well as the international community.  There is no realistic hope 
that both sides will turn their collective arms on the IS, but as of the final 
writing of this article, the Islamic State holds nearly half of Syria’s 
territory.150  This newest obstacle must, by necessity, become the focus of 
the conflict before the two sides have any chance of finding a path toward 
peace. 
 
 
 150. See Yan & Said, supra note 147. 
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